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Abstract
As a critical site of democratic action, the grassroots
electoral campaigning is undergoing a transformation
with the influence of digital tools in mobilizing
the electorate. Through an ethnographic study
conducted in Madurai and Thiruvananthapuram during
the months prior to the 2019 Indian Parliamentary
Elections, the study attempts to map the technology
adoption among political workers, in relation to their
party/leaders, voters, and other stakeholders in the
electoral landscape. Using the typology presented in the
new repertoire of social movement action, we categorize
the internet-based and internet-supported campaigning
tools, according to the threshold of risk and effort
involved in undertaking the activities. Illustrating with
perspectives from the grassroots political agents, the
paper aspires to extend the literature related to digital
political mobilization and contribute to the study of
democratic systems.
1. Introduction
The election festivities were at a fever pitch in
Madurai and Thiruvananthapuram - party rented jeeps
blaring political slogans, the city walls decorated with
party colours and symbols, banners and flags hung pole
to pole and party workers fervently canvassing at every
corner. As ubiquitous was another, more silent election
noise of constantly lighting up smart phone screens in
almost every hand. The 2019 Indian election was fought
on the ground, as much as it was fought on the virtual
space, one interweaving with the other.
In this paper, we present an ethnographic report
of campaign politics from these two constituencies in
the 2019 Indian general elections. Through the lens
of a typology for digital action in social movements
presented by Jeroen Van Laer & Peter Van Aelst[1],
we attempt to understand the kinds of activities
that grassroots-level campaigners undertake in a large
electoral event and how they have been impacted by
technology adoption in this space. While there is much
recent work on politicians and their use of technology,
particularly social media, little substantial work exists
on how the routine functions of an electoral campaign
have changed, in particular, how the work of grassroots
political workers who do the door-to-door campaigning
and voter mobilization has changed. In this research, we
seek to answer the following research questions:
1. How has digital technology changed the
functional aspects of grassroots political workers’
outreach?
2. How do grassroots political workers perform their
new functions which have come into practice
because of their access to the digital technology?
For ease of understanding throughout this work, we
use internet or digital technology to refer to a range
of services provided through the internet and mobile
communications networks including social networking
sites, app based platforms, websites, search engines,
meme/gif/poster/image generating software and the
affordances that these avenues provide.
2. Related Work
Political Party-based Mobilization and Internet:
The increase in the number of daily internet and mobile
app users has correspondingly changed the nature of
outreach and brand management across a range of
fields, including politics[2]. For political parties,
this has signaled a need to evolve culturally, both as
organizations, and in terms of how they approach their
communications. Chadwick notes that “political parties
are undergoing a process of adaptation to post-material
political culture brought on by the affordances and
uses of digital media[3].” These developments have
helped create new means for parties to build and
rejuvenate themselves (or indeed lose momentum with
constituents, compared to their rivals), powered by “new
digital foot soldiers” creating new frontlines of their
outreach strategies[4].
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Unconventional techniques, made possible by
information and communication technologies, have
become a widely popular means of distributing news,
discussing political issues[5], thereby building political
narratives leading up to an election. In their study
of various phases of election campaigns, Andrea and
Drik[6] classify them into four categories: pre-modern,
modern, professionalized and mediatized phase. The
final phase of mediatization, according to them, is
distinguishable by key traits such as new applications
of communication technologies and quantitative data
in election campaigns[6]. This phase, marked by
changes in the political institutions due to the increasing
significance of media, especially online media sets the
stage for our work on technology adoption among
grassroot political workers.
In the current mediatized environment, the internal
and external stakeholders of political parties establish
new “participative and communicative structures” to
foster new forms of engagement[5]. In addition to
opening new platforms for fulfilling modern demands
that emerge in digital political engagement, the online
outreach allows for cost-effective means of certain
forms of collective action [7], and help create new ways
of both widening the reach of who can actively engage
in a campaign, rather than be passive supporters, partly
by offering more emotional access[6], and a public-like
forum, which can circumvent the established structures
of political authority as well as the symbolic dominance
of mainstream media[8]. Increasingly, in order to
sustain, political parties need to equip themselves with
technically-skilled personnel, who may not contribute
the traditional resources valued to campaigns such as
time, money, civil skills, or muscle, but bring value
through their knowledge of the latest technologies that
can be used for a range of political purposes[9, 10].
In addition to that, social media use not just impacts
shaping of political communication but shaping the
media itself in order to serve well as mediator among
citizens and between citizens and government[11].
Mobilizing the digital foot soldiers within the party
machinery and party supporters on the outside becomes
a crucial act towards mobilizing voters, a process
that has increasingly taken on digital proportions
in the last decade. Mobilization, here, is defined
as the development of a social relationship between
two types of actors, the individuals and the parties.
Mobilization broadly includes three processes: interest
formation (cognitive dimension), community building
(affective dimension), and employing means of action
(instrumental dimension)[12]. In her work, Norris
explains how ICTs can strengthen direct pluralist
democracy by facilitating the mobilization of multiple
interests to influence the political process [13]. On
the one hand, it is widely proposed that online
outreach methods substantially benefits resource deficit
organizations that do not traditionally have access to
mass media outlets[11], and on the other hand, scholars
advocate that the Internet may change the, “logic of
participation” through mobilization by creating new
platforms for participants who would have otherwise
remained out of political space[14, 15]. Further,
internet supports “mesomobilization” by providing a
medium and new tool for groups and organizations
to coordinate and integrate other groups, organizations
and networks for expressing their solidarity towards
a cause[16]. The Cambridge Analytica controversy
and the exposing of the role of social media in
hyper local targeting, generated a discourse around
political social media communication and the top
down fashion of manufacturing people’s political
opinions[17]. However, scant attention was paid to
understand how grassroots campaigns and the actors
involved are impacted by these changes in political
campaigning. Our work is an important step forward
in examining this aspect of the transition in the
electoral landscape in India, by looking at Madurai and
Thiruvananthapuram.
Digital Political Mobilization in India: India
has recently witnessed various initiatives spearheaded
by the election commission, political parties and
social movement groups that use information and
communication technologies (ICTs) to promote
electoral reform and political mobilization [18]. Our
work highlights the groundlevel use and implication of
these technologies illustrated through experiences of
boothworkers. Even with the rapid indian onboard onto
social media platforms, as compared to the mainstream
media, the number of active voters on these platforms
are comparatively fewer - Twitter’s monthly active users
are at 30-33 million, Facebook’s are at 270 million, and
WhatsApp at more than 230 million. However, ICTs
and the ease with which the middle and upper classes
can access and use them plays a central role in enabling
the targeting and re-engagement of mostly these classes
with the political process [19]. Since journalists’ use the
political discussions and updates made by politicians on
social media as their official source of information, the
information, as well as the misinformation generated
in social media platforms also reaches the non-social
media users through print and e-news, and shapes the
political opinion of majority population [20]. The
conversations that are happening in the digital space
still stays relevant in the country which is marked by
huge digital divide.
The 2014 election, touted as the first social
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media election in India, had a total of 56 million
election-related tweets posted within the span of 2 years
and 4 months before the elections [21]. Bharatiya Janata
Party, a major rightwing political party, with the first
mover advantage, adopted the three key elements of
political communication - political organisations, the
audience and the mediathrough which political actions
are “conceived and realised” in their election campaign
strategy [22]. In addition to their political network,
at an organisational level, BJP has the support of its
cultural wing - Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
a disciplined and well connected network of grassroot
workers engaged in social mobilization. RSS functions
as bedrock not only for organising key campaign
activities, but also provides feedback for improving the
campaign strategies of BJP [23].
Some of the prior works in this area have tried
to understand the politics of abusive exchange on
social media[24], how right-wing political volunteers
of right-wing political party use social media online
archiving [25], the role of media which includes print,
television and social media in the making of the
“common man” [8], how parody and satire on the web
are intervening within political and social discourse
within national public spheres [26], how internet hindus
function in the Indian cyberspace[27], the representation
of Indian women’s political views on the twitter verse
[28], and the social media usage by specific Indian
political parties [29, 30]. With our paper, we attempt
to understand the way grassroots political workers use
social media and the difference the internet has brought
to their everyday life and work.
Social Movement Repertoire: In their work, Jeroen
Van Laer & Peter Van Aelst[1] present a typology for
a new repertoire of social movement action that
“illustrates how the internet has shaped and is shaping
social movements and the tactics they use to pursue
their claims.” The typology examines two dimensions
- firstly, it looks at ‘real’ or traditional actions that
have been employed in social movements and how
they are supported and modified by the internet today.
Apart from these, there are strategies that have emerged
because of the internet which are ‘virtual’ actions and
are hence, relatively new additions to the repertoire
of social movement action. These internet-supported
and internet-based actions have ‘complemented and
expanded’ available collective actions, congregating
to form the ‘digitized’ repertoire of social movement
action. The second dimension evaluates the low or high
threshold of the action in terms of practical participation
cost involved, such as resources needed (energy, time
and money) as well as the potential cost or risk of
undertaking the action, for example, getting arrested for
an illegal activity.
The permeable nature of the tactics is reflected in
the typology - for example, an email petition which is a
variant of a traditional form of protest that has found
efficiency on an electronic platform, would be in the
internet based category but placed closer to the internet
supported space along the continuum. Similarly,
signing an email petition might hold negligible costs in
comparison to using hacktivism as a strategy, which is a
higher threshold activity considering the skills required
and the legality of the act itself. The typology takes
into account the literature surrounding how the internet
supports and creates new modes of collective action
with regard to organization, mobilization as well as the
transnational character that social movements have been
adopting with the changing impact of global capital on
national policies and people. This framework stresses
on the principal potential of the internet to minimize
mobilizational costs of politico-social action as it is an
environment that redefines space and time constraints.
3. Methodology
Two authors of the paper engaged in an ethnographic
study of the urban, grassroots electoral process in
Madurai, Tamilnadu and Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala.
This involved interviews, attendance at party meetings,
and observations at poll events such as in door-to-door
campaigns and public gatherings. We observed both
locations from November 2019 to the respective dates of
polling in the two locations in May 2019. Interviewed
persons include party leaders (11), party IT cell
members (9), political strategists working on campaign
logistics as well as social media and marketing (7),
party activists such as post holders or booth committee
members (31), journalists (3), and citizen influencers
(5) who do not have formal positions in the party,
but were engaged in political activity. We recruited
interviewees from across the political spectrum and and
ensured that we followed the campaigns of and met with
representatives of all the major national and state parties
that had a candidate in the fray directly or in coalition.
Shadowing the booth workers, who included
party supporters and volunteers to political committee
office bearers or elected representatives such as ward
councillors, we observed the activities that occurred
at various phases. These workers were typically
referred to as ‘squad groups’ which could be either
male, female, or mixed. Our observations included
the planned activities such as voter verification visits
or canvassing at voter’s home or group activities such
as road shows or small home-based gatherings and
ad-hoc activities such as interactions at street junctions,
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or unplanned community visits. We also observed
party committee planning and strategy meetings, and
were able to interview party functionaries on their
management of the process - such as media material
creation, booth worker surveillance, management of
influencers such as party patrons, teachers, residence
association chairpersons etc. The interactions we
had with respondents (and each other) influenced the
framing of the interview schedule. The interviews
were recorded and then transcribed verbatim, translated
when required and analyzed through a grounded theory
approach. The two primary researchers read each
others’ interviews, and coded them, and the coding
schema was polished over several hours of iterative
whiteboarding. The high-level thematic areas that
surfaced in the initial interviews were further used to
align the interview questions in the later part of the
fieldwork. Mobilization emerged as a central thematic
area.
The two locations we picked were partly due to
our own expertise with elections - both researchers are
local to the respective regions. Unlike in the rest of
the country, where the BJP enjoys a very significant
lead over its rivals, in the south, where the states of
Tamil Nadu and Kerala are located, it has a relatively
minor presence. Tamil Nadu is important in the 2019
election because of the changes in its political scenario
– the top political parties in the state, the Dradvida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), lost their
charismatic leaders, who drove their respective vote
banks. We selected Madurai, an urban constituency
in the state that expected a three way race between
the ruling AIADMK alliance with the BJP, which
is in power at the center in New Delhi, the DMK
alliance with the Communist Party of India-Maxist
(CPIM) and INC, and a possible third front with
splinter groups of the AIADMK and newly formed
parties. In Kerala, we selected Thiruvananthapuram,
which was widely expected to have a well-matched
three way contest between the ruling INC, the CPIM,
and the BJP. In both locations, we sampled respondents
through a mix of connections through party offices and
journalists, and snowballed interviewees through these
initial connections.
Using the typology presented in the “digitalized
social movement repertoire”, we enlisted the tools the
booth worker used at the various phases leading up to
the election and created memos describing the activity,
the internet use and the layered commitment required
of the worker to undertake the tactic. These details
were circulated among our research team, who work
on qualitative and quantitative social media studies
and it guided the evaluation of the tools in terms of
the dimensions presented in the typology - internet
based/supported or high/low threshold of cost and
risk. The authors used this discussion, to validate the
placement of the tools within the four quadrants in the
typology.
4. Findings
We categorize the mobilizational tools used by
political actors according to the typology and portray it
through the diagram in figure 1. We elaborate on the
items distributed across the four quadrants (Q1 - Q4)
through an analysis of our observations and interactions.
Figure 1. Typology of Digitalized Political
Mobilization Repertoire
4.1. Q1 : Low-threshold Internet-supported
Interactive Voice Recording: Social media allows
the leader of a party new means of supporting booth
work through direct action. The chief minister
of the state, J Jayalalitha, was an iconic politician
who ran a personality-centric campaign for her party
highlighting her photographs and moniker, Amma,
literally meaning ‘Mother’, on campaign material, often
more significantly than imagery or discourse of either
the party or the local candidate [31]. One of the
unique technology-supported experiments attempted in
the 2014 campaign was Interactive Voice Response
conversations with voters, which after an initial phone
engagement would move to a recorded message from
Jayalalitha.
“In 2016 elections, through IVR a
customised call was made to the individual
voter of every constituency. Voice of
Amma, greeted the individual, promised
the voter that she will address the issue
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that prevailed in their constituency and
requested the voter to vote for her party.
Few people believed that Amma herself
spoke to them - Manohar, Booth Worker,
Madurai”
Technology allowed the spectre of direct contact
between the leader and the population, allowing booth
workers to refer citizens to a means of listening
to a message that appeared to be crafted to them
individually. The IVR thus acts as an enhanced
pamphlet. The technological artifact here cannot be
extracted from the context and history of personality
politics in Tamil Nadu, where the long dead former
chief minister M G Ramachandran, and erstwhile leader
of Jayalalitha’s political party, the AIADMK, is still
symbolically critical in bringing votes for his party.
Indeed, several years after his death, a significant base
of voters still believed he was alive and well. The
viscerality of voice outreach in this environment is
highlighted in the belief, by some potential voters, that
the IVR was a direct conversation between them and
Jayalalitha.
Poll Manipulation: This relatively low threshold
activity involved gaming television polls by getting
a number of volunteers or paid election workers to
repeatedly vote to manipulate the outcomes of a media
event. Mobilization has two forms here - first, the
aggressive mobilization of people in networks to act on
a specific event. Where a small number of volunteers
can vote repeatedly, they may do so from the confines of
a single office. But in other cases, the mobilization may
involve getting a disperse set of supporters to get online
in a very short period of time and vote aggressively.
“There are Teams in the head office
whose function is just to watch all the TV
channels and inform us in advance about
the (audience) polls on TV Channels. At
the end of every debate, through online
polls, (such polls) ask the stance of public
on a particular social or political issue
or the leader whom they support etc. (At
this point) all the IT wing members, as a
team respond to these polls with the stand
which our party proposes”-Ahmad, IT Wing
Secretary, Madurai
Often, such votes need to be made using SMS, which
involves a cost for the volunteer. Such mobilization
for political parties is inspired by vote manipulations
for television talent shows in which performers on
television may be ranked based on the number of votes
they receive.
4.2. Q2: High-threshold Internet-supported
Door-to-Door Canvassing: Being an effective
canvasser is a central criterion on which a booth worker
is selected to work for a candidate. In addition to
soliciting people in their homes, booth workers organize
and lead group discussions, in which they relay the key
positions of a candidate as well as use group persuasion
as a means of mobilizing the voters.
These activities present logistical challenges - a
booth worker must be able to conduct the door-to-door
work at times when they are likely to encounter their
intended audience. They must also ensure that if a
group activity needs to be conducted, then they will
be welcomed within the physical spaces of a potential
voter’s home, or if they do this in their own physical
spaces, that the requisite audience shows up for a
session. In the past, the typical outreach process
revolved around working hours, which meant that male
voters were more likely to be solicited in weekends
and evenings, while females in a household would be
approached during afternoons. In location 1, we found
that the growth of workforce participation of females
impacted the logistics of how solicitation could be done.
“these days women are also going to
work. So we cant go to their home
anytime and every time for campaigning.
Also, it is easy for candidates to reach
slums and economically weaker section of
the society very easily. But people in
gated societies and in posh localities of
the city don’t encourage campaigners. So
pamphlets and posters were used in the
past to let the people know about the
candidate. Today, this is replaced by
WhatsApp messages, Facebook posts and
YouTube videos”- Mannan, Booth Worker,
Madurai
The quote above shows how class issues impact
the ability of a booth worker to approach their client
populations. First, the hours of work a booth worker
keeps can influence who they have access to. Second,
gender dynamics impact who can be approached and
when - there may be a preference for female only
outreach for households that were likely to have
only female members at the time of the visit, and
likewise, the comfort and effectiveness of a single
female booth worker operating in male spaces may need
consideration.
Changes in urbanization patterns have meant
that wealthier voters are harder to reach through
door-to-door solicitation. Pamphlets can only be
placed where a household’s door or main entrance is
accessible, likewise, street level posters have limited
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value in attracting voters who are not part of daily foot
traffic. Social media outreach could be useful both
for organizing door-to-door visits more effectively as
well and for outreach to those stakeholders that were
otherwise difficult to reach in gated communities or
apartment complexes.
Cash Distribution: In Tamil Nadu, cash and
freebies have historically been known to be part of
the campaign outreach process. In the most recent
election, prior to our research, the word on the street
was that cash was distributed in packets snuck into the
morning newspapers - the move was so successful that
polling hit a record 89%, and the technique of cash
distribution got its own name - the “Thirumangalam
formula”. In this environment, booth workers must be
trustworthy and competent, because millions worth of
unaccounted cash is distributed to potential voters, with
no confirmed means of knowing if the giveaway will
bear fruit. Political parties typically appoint people of
means to be as district level post holders, because in
taking on this position, the individual often commits
to spending their own funds to ensure a victory for
the party. Being a significant post holder can be a
means of various forms of earning down the line through
being a middleman in transactions, but doing so requires
showing some intent to the party as well.
Booth workers who work for a political party during
the election are paid a wage of Rs. 300 per day in
addition to food, snacks and transport service. While
this remuneration plays a part in attracting workers,
being a party member is also a means of signaling
importance in society and a segue into networks that
can get things done. The booth worker bears the risk
of the entire amount of unaccounted cash that they
are assigned, and must often think of creative ways of
distributing to the right people who are likely to vote for
the party, or at least definitely not vote for the party if
they don’t get a token amount.
Booth workers have traditionally worked out ways
of hiding their transactions during election season, the
circulation of cash distribution info on social media and
on monitoring apps added a new layer of complexity to
their work. The Election Commission of India (ECI)
built a mobile application called cVIGIL enable citizens
to report violation of election code of conduct, while
this app was used by the booth workers to report issues
related to the other parties, they needed to be cautious
that if they themselves indulged in illegal work, the right
person with the tool could easily report them. ECI,
launched another app named Voter Helpline to develop
a culture of responsible electoral engagement. This
app turned out to have an unintended consequence -
to allowing parties better granular knowledge on their
likely voters at the booth level. Booth workers of
Location 1 used this app for accessing the details of the
voters. They see this app as an updated, easy to access,
handy and paper saving version of voter slips, which has
basic information about the voter.
“Voter Helpline has updated information
about all the voters. Our boys learned
how to use this app immediately. With
the available updated information, we
identified the list of neutral voters and
distributed cash and freebies to them”-
Ramanan,Booth Worker, Madurai
Essentially, the booth workers were able to
extrapolate, at the family level, from the existing
data who were their likely voters at most booths.
Consequently, by the time a booth worker is at a
doorstep, they have a fairly good idea of whether they
are talking to a swing vote household, and whether a
cash donation is likely to bear fruit. The booth workers
can keep track of whether the individuals they thought
were likely voters for their party did or did not show up
at their polling stations on the day of the election. By a
certain hour in the day each person who was recorded
as having received a donation or noted as a likely voter
will be visited physically or called over the phone and
pressurizes them to vote. This same information can
also be aggregated at the booth levels and sent up the
chain to give campaign managers a better sense of
where they stand with the polling.
Political Event Management: Politicians generally
organise events such as guest lectures, rallies,
roadshows, etc to meet the people directly and
discuss their agenda. Presence of huge crowd at these
political events is one of the means to display the
strength of the parties both to the people and the rival
parties. With the support of technology, they are not
only able to mobilize people for the events, but they are
also able to come up with new ideas for organising the
events which are different from the conventional ones.
We found that booth workers used Google ads, which
allows customization based on target location to invite
people in a specific geographical location to participate
in the events, and to create variations for one single ad.
Getting good turnout at a political event from their
assigned localities is one of the key functions of a
good booth worker. With the onset of social media
as one means of announcing events, a question booth
workers need to grapple with is how many of those
who respond to an event will actually show up. In this
case, boothworkers may live cast an event, but still rely
on their analog means to round up attendees. Here,
relying on innovations to encourage in-person attendees
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can be handy - one party used a SelfieWith(candidate)
technique to add value to physical attendance [32].
This both helped to make sure that people got a chance
to publicly perform their allegiance to a candidate
by posting their selfies, but also brand the candidate
online as an approachable person, willing to spend time
interacting with citizens on an individual basis.
Data Collection and Analysis: For large
populations who have skipped the desktop and
laptop stage to the smartphone era, mobile apps are an
increasingly popular tool for the party to collect voter
data directly from the electorate through booth workers
without ‘skilling’ them. At the booth office, we noticed
that workers continue to rely on notebooks, diaries,
political reports and forms that have won them elections
in the past. Demographic data in terms of age, religion,
caste, occupation, party affiliation collected in pieces
through booths using apps and consolidated at a state
level digital platform, presents a map of action for the
new crop of digital content generators, strategists and
marketers who have become crucial stakeholders in the
‘new digitized elections’.
“When we go to each house, we know the
info, but we still ask and enter this info
- Is this person a supporter of our party,
or supporting rival party? If our party, is
this person here? If not, can we bring this
person to vote? Collect Mobile number.
The app has GPS. We don’t need an internet
connection for entering this info. The info
gets uploaded when we are in an area that
has an internet connection. Once this is
done, we know the areas that we are strong
in and where we are weak. It’s the same
squad work that we used to do. We have
just made it digital. ”- Prakash, Party Area
Committee Member, Thiruvananthapuram
In addition to direct collection of demographic
data, party members noted purchasing data from local
vendors who collect customer information, such as
their Aadhar (national ID) number from shops such as
jewellery or mobile shops where this information needs
to be deposited for a purchase. This information is then
used to nudge likely supporters, but also to potentially
suppress those who are likely to vote against a party.
4.3. Q3: Low-threshold Internet-based
WhatsAppGroupCreation: While there have been
steps taken by social media companies to regulate what
politicians do on their platforms, parties and the booth
workers operating on their behalf continue to use the
affordances of the technology for a range of outreach
activities. In location 2, we found that the going rate for
WhatsApp groups that could be purchased from vendors
was Rs. 400 (approximately $6 USD) per 250-member
group. Such groups were put together by people who
had access to lists of phone numbers, such as employees
of telecom companies, who would ping a number to
check if it ran WhatsApp, following which the phone
numbers would be involuntarily added to a group.
On the ground, there is also a cottage industry of
companies that provide outreach across party lines. For
instance, one vendor charged Rs.100,000 per assembly
constituency for sending an individual WhatsApp
message with approximately 500 characters. These
companies at the most basic level were able to give
access to phone numbers, but given their access to
individuals with technical skills, some had evolved into
providing value-added services for campaigns. One
vendor provided a “21 days messaging strategy” in
which on first 7 days, negative messages are sent to
tarnish the image of the rival party, followed by a week
of messaging about welfare schemes and the election
manifesto of the party, followed by a last phase in which
the candidate is the main key for the next 7 days and on
the third phase, they promote their candidate.
“In WhatsApp, a group named “Tamilian”
was created. People joined the group
as interesting information about Tamil
language and culture was shared on this
group. But on infrequent intervals, posts
were made in support of Seeman (a Tamil
ultra-nationalist politician). Similarly,
groups to promote spiritual messages are
created, on infrequent intervals, they posts
messages to support BJP”- Mahesh, Booth
worker, Madurai
Once a group is created, a normative argument is
typically offered in addition to the political imperative.
We found that while some campaigns used WhatsApp
groups named for the candidate, others aimed to
appeal through alternate constructions that appealed
ideologically or to some form of identity creation that
held a deeper affective appeal. A case in point is
the pseudo-group we see in the quote above. Social
media platforms, especially Whatsapp groups, become
arenas for brand building and networking for booth
workers. At each node of party hierarchy - state, district,
constituency and local area, exists an official WhatsApp
group of elected representatives, party leaders and other
important party office bearers connected to the party
IT wing. Clusters of unofficial WhatsApp groups
initiated by local party workers also mushroom along
these nodes, which might involve the candidate, a
few important local stakeholders such as local party
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leaders, government officials, journalists and residents’
association office bearers who have a sway over groups
of people within the locality. These are formed
under various collective identities such as residential
membership which may intersect with religion and caste
based identities. And then there are groups formed
based on caste and religion, often male only, without
the masquerade of a less divisive agenda. These groups
may or may not have rival party members, by design,
according to the intent of the group. We were told,
heterogeneous party affiliation in group membership
was one way of gaining information regarding the
opposition’s arguments in an otherwise echo chamber
environment.
Trending Hashtags: A reality of political events
on the ground is that they require a significant amount
of behind the scenes management in planning an
event - such as the location, media outreach, crowd
management, and the handling of the key figures -
the politicians themselves. These can be even more
tricky for a political party in opposition, since the
state may choose to use its power to manipulate an
opposition party’s access to public spaces, its right to
congregate, access to state media etc. In conversation
with political operatives, we found that social media
reduced the need for some kinds of physical events
involving stages, loudspeakers, and cadre organizations
since parties had better means of doing outreach in those
areas where an expensive physical meeting may not
have the desired ‘bang-for-the-buck’ in terms of voter
mobilization. In these locations, having strong social
media based outreach reminds voters that they are on
the minds of the party, offsetting some of the attention
lost by not doing a large physical event.
While outreach for a physical event seems like an
obvious thing that social media enables - thus replicating
the affordances of flash mobs by spreading the word on
a political event, there is also the occasional crisis that
can be enacted on social media. In one case, a political
operative told us of a public event which was denied
permission by a police official on a flimsy ground,
presumably acting on the instructions the party’s rivals,
who were the party in power in state. In his words, the
party immediately went on overdrive on social media
calling out the ruling party and making it against the
party:
“(after he cancelled the event) we were able
to trend our hashtag within an hour. Later,
the police officer himself called us over
phone and requested us to not make any
further posts in social media and granted
permission for organising the meeting.”-
Uma, IT Wing Secretary, Madurai
Party functionaries were able to quickly mobilize and
turn the situation in favour of them. The creation of a
villain - ruling party against democracy - found affective
appeal online, and supporters of the party quickly piled
on, which in turn brought the mainstream media into
the fray. This case highlights how a social media
affordance for trolling or doxxing a public official
made him politically vulnerable and back off from
action against a party. The specific case highlighted, of
police or magistrate officials being used to gently block
opposition parties is common in elections, and parties
typically are restricted to expensive analogy processes
of protest, such as taking out a rally outside a police
station or collectorate, which would also probably
take long enough that the window of opportunity for
a political event would be lost. Social media allowed
a relatively low-cost means of putting pressure on an
official.
4.4. Q4: High-threshold Internet-based
Creative Content Creation: Booth workers
consider memes as an essential non-violent political
weapon. They either engage themselves or recruit
specialists for designing memes to promote themselves
and pull down the rival party. In addition to sound
political knowledge, memes creators require basic
technical skills to articulate themselves creatively. Some
of the booth workers who were involved in physical
fights in the past to establish their position of power,
are now directing their energy towards countering the
memes of the rival party.
“Generally, people check their social media
accounts during their free time, mostly
at night when they come back from work
or after completing their daily routine.
They prefer watching light-hearted or
entertaining stuff such as memes, in that
short time, instead of the conventional
heated debates or long editorial pieces”-
Rasul, IT Wing Member, Madurai
Social media allows less established parties to
bypass traditional gatekeepers, build narratives that
reach a large audience which can simultaneously be
picked up by on ground support. Political bipolarity in
Kerala led by the Congress Party and the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) have cultivated a political
hegemony that coalesces in the centrist and centre left
political spectrum through owned media of popular
newspaper and TV channels. A far right party like
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) attempted to underplay
its ‘Hindu-ness’ to be palatable to the voters of the
state, until the Sabarimala issue (the Supreme Court
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of India overturned a ban on the entry of women of
menstruating age into Sabarimala temple in Kerala )
dropped right into the Overton window for the party.
By emerging as the voice of the devotee (mainly
upper caste and the sizeable and politically influential
Nair community), it began grabbing mainstream media
coverage as the leaders of the mainstream parties
attempted to firefight the situation. Floating between
mainstream and far right, the booth workers could pick
and choose the narrative and customize according to the
audience, staging a ‘Hinduism in danger’ atmosphere.
Re-branding extremists pasts to cool conservatism and
using provocative issues to gain agenda setting power
are two winning strategies used by the BJP at the
national level.
Campaign Management Apps: With the
‘appification’ of campaign management, new forms of
surveilling and disciplining the booth worker emerge.
The panoptic system of the app, although not strictly
examined by party leaders, gives the impression that
you are being tracked, your activity measured and
hence, one has to fall in line. The gamification element,
where the best performing workers with maximum
number of house visits are publicly commended
through a broadcast message on your phone, creates a
model behavior of an ideal booth worker that they feel
compelled to emulate.
“As part of the party’s youth wing, we have
to go to each house and talk about issues.
There is a barcode (QR) on the poster that
we carry to each house. We go to the house
and scan this code on the app - Campaign
Management. It is proof that we went to
the houses. They can check this through
satellite. If I dont do it, I might lose my
position.”- Mujeeb, Party Block Secretary,
Thiruvananthapuram
Conversations with party workers highlighted that booth
work can tend to be shoddy - the booth workers may
or may not work based on a cadre system, loyalties
may be dependent on the political currency extended to
them. In such a system, as the booth worker mentions,
members of the surveilled are also active participants
that hold up the system since there is a check on the
other. In the normalization of this behaviour, you
transform yourself into the subject surveilled. At this
stage of introducing apps for campaign management,
they are unsure whether these ‘points’ and ‘levels’
on apps could materialize into political patronage and
future candidacy.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The literature discussing digital developments in
the political landscape, largely present arguments
and findings centered around digital artifacts and
their use by politicians. Our study shows that the
tactical imperatives of campaign management have been
changed by internet-based and -supported activities
and that these have created significant demands on
grassroots workers to effectively use and digital artifacts
in their professional practice - both to continue doing
things that no longer operate in the analog forms, but
also to adapt to new forms of outreach and organization
that complement traditional means of election work.
First, we see that the reducing cost of access to the
internet, and the gradual importance of social media as
a space for political discourse has made it central to
both the organization of people, in which the grassroots
workers play a central role and mobilization of content.
Counter to the idea that social media is a democratized
space for outreach, we find that internet-based activities
are active spaces of contestation that resource-rich
parties game through expensive targeted marketing,
using the grassroots workers as the critical conduit for
this information.
Second, we see that social media is changing
the nature of the relationship between the party and
its grassroots workers, creating automated systems of
surveillance and discipline in the garb of efficiency.
We also see how the internet- and big data-supported
analysis works; how the unintended consequences of
open data related to the electorate have created a
new crop of professionalized campaigning that allowed
parties to act on, at a very granular level, voter turnout,
bribing, and mobilization.
Doing these effectively requires resources to access
and manipulate the data, and act on it at the ground
level. This puts cash-rich parties at a unique advantage
in major elections. In this process, we see a
rapid congregation of new stakeholders and different
spheres of action such as political consultancies, digital
marketers whose work often cannot be closely observed
by monitoring agencies, leaving them to self-regulate
in the high stakes environment of a general election.
The outcomes of the Cambridge Analytica scandal have
shown the risks of process manipulation through the
widely used digital tools - our work shows how these
functions on the ground. At present, the Election
Commission of India is examining the spending of
political parties on social media advertisements but
our work shows the difficulty of effective monitoring
on the ground when outreach cannot specifically be
considered “paid advertisements.” This work gives
insight into the unique challenges of formulating a
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regulatory infrastructure that is more informed and
evidence-based.
Future Work: Our work sets the foundation for
a larger body of work on election campaigning in a
digital technology era. We hope this leads to deeper
ethnographic work on political workers themselves,
the impact of gender on outreach work, as well as
comparative work on the differences between regions
and ideological formations in terms of how they impact
grassroots outreach. Finally, we hope that this work
contributes to a growing literature in CSCW and social
media studies on ethics in election campaigns.
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